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The incidence of MRSA infections in the
United States: is a more comprehensive
tracking system needed?
Kevin T. Kavanagh1*, Said Abusalem2 and Lindsay E. Calderon3

Abstract
A review of epidemiological studies on the incidence of MRSA infections overtime was performed along with an analysis
of data available for download from Hospital Compare (https://data.medicare.gov/data/hospital-compare). We found the
estimations of the incidence of MRSA infections varied widely depending upon the type of population studied, the types
of infections captured and in the definitions and terminology used to describe the results. We could not find definitive
evidence that the incidence of MRSA infections in U.S. community or facilities is decreasing significantly. Of concern are
recent data reported to the National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) on MRSA bloodstream infections which indicate
that by the end of 2015 there had been little change in the average facility Standardized Infection Ratio (0.988), compared
to a 2010–2011 baseline and is significantly increased compared to the previous year. This is in contradistinction to the
recent Veterans Administration study which reported over an 80% reduction in MRSA infections. However, this
discrepancy may be due to the inability to reconcile the baselines of the two data sets; and the observed increase may
be artifactual due to aberrations in the NHSN tracking system. Our review supports the need for implementation of a
comprehensive tracking and monitoring system involving all types of healthcare facilities for multi-drug resistant
organisms, along with concomitant funding for both staff and infrastructure. Without such a system, determining
the effectiveness of interventions such as antibiotic stewardship and chlorhexidine bathing will be hindered.
Keywords: Surveillance, MRSA, Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, EIP, Emerging Infection Program, Multi-drug
resistant organisms, Epidemiology, MDRO, VA, UHC

Introduction
Recent investigative reports in the media has brought into
question the adequacy of the United States’ Methicillinresistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) tracking system
along with whether the epidemic of MRSA is being
brought under control [1].
Currently the United States has adopted a “one size does
not fit all” approach and has relatively few mandates related to infection control. The Presidential Advisory
Council on Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria is
studying these issues, but data supporting the contention
that the MRSA epidemic is being brought under control
appears to be largely derived from the Emerging Infection
Program (EIP). The data from this program has come
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under criticism by the news media for its sample size, age
and limited geographic representation [1].
Having a standardized reportable methodology with
comparative data is critical to enable both researchers
and policy makers to formulate and implement effective
protocols to confront the epidemic of MRSA in the
United States. The following are major epidemiology reports with varying methods of tracking and reporting of
MRSA infections.
Emerging infection program (EIP)

There are three major papers which summarized progressive results in adult patients from the EIP surveillance program which derives its data from nine
metropolitan areas in the United States [2–4]. Since each
paper encompasses and adds onto the data previously
reported, we will focus our comments on the last report
of Dantes, et al. [4]. These studies reported “invasive”
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MRSA infections as detected by laboratory-based case
finding. An invasive infection was defined as a positive
MRSA culture from a normally sterile site, such as
blood, pleural fluid, peritoneal fluid, cerebral spinal fluid,
or bone [2, 4, 5]. Eighty percent of invasive infections
had positive blood cultures and only 22% were skin infections [4]. The overall in-hospital fatality rate was 13%.
This definition mainly captures severe infections. The
infection shown in Fig. 1 would not necessarily be reportable under the invasive infection metric. For data acquisition dates 2005–2011, Dantes, et al., reported a
27.7% decrease for healthcare-associated communityonset, 54.2% decrease in hospital-onset (culture taken
greater than three days after admission), but only a 5.0%
decrease in community associated infections.
Covering a similar time-period (2005–2010) and using
data from the EIP, Iwamoto, et al. [5] reported that in
pediatric patients 90 days and older, there was not a significant decrease in hospital-onset, or healthcareassociated community-onset “invasive” MRSA infections.
They also observed a 10.2% per year increase in
community-associated “invasive” infections. However, they
did observe significant decrease in MRSA infections of
11.3% per year in children 3–89 days of age [5].
The surveillance network (TSN) database-USA

This tracking system contains electronically submitted
data from more than 300 laboratories across the United
States [6]. For data acquisition years 2005–2008, Klein,
et al. [6] reported a stable rate of MRSA related hospitalizations for pneumonia and blood infections; whereas
the proportion of cultures with the assumed hospital associated MRSA phenotypes increased. This data appears
to contradict the EIP data reported by Kallen, et al. [3]
for the same data acquisition dates which showed decreasing MRSA infections, being most pronounced with

Fig. 1 MRSA infection which would not necessarily be reportable under
the bloodstream or invasive infection metrics. Centers of Disease Control
and Prevention photo archive (Photo credit: Gregory Moran, M.D)
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healthcare-associated infections. Klein, et al. [6] stated a
possible explanation for this difference was geographical
variability and that their sample had greater geographical
representation.
University healthcare consortium data (UHC)

The UHC estimated MRSA infections per 1000 hospital
discharges from Academic Medical Centers and found that
MRSA infections, as determined from billing data, doubled
(20.9–41.7) between the years of 2003 and 2008 [7].
National healthcare safety network (NHSN)

The NHSN is a comprehensive reporting system for laboratory identified MRSA bloodstream infections that
occur in acute care hospitals which participate with
Medicare’s Prospective Payment System. Infections that
occur greater than three calendar days after admission
are defined as hospital-onset. Infection rates are risk adjusted and compared to a 2010–2011 baseline [8]. However, standardized data are available for MRSA
bloodstream infections in less than 2000 of the approximate 5000 acute care facilities in the United States. In
addition, small rural hospitals which are defined as critical access and pediatric facilities may not have reported
data. Veterans Administration and military hospitals also
use a different system for quality control and reporting
of infections. Critical access hospitals also tend to have
limited resources to confront infection disease and are
at risk of disseminating resistant organisms to larger facilities through their referral network.
As shown in Fig. 2, there has been little or no change
in infection rates compared to the 2010 to 2011 baseline
[9]. Initially, there appeared to be a slight decrease, but
the rates have trended upward and returned to the baseline. It should be noted that the baseline data was collected under voluntary reporting, as the subsequent data
shown in Table 1 was collected with mandatory reporting.
Thus, one could argue that the baseline data was from
higher performing facilities. In addition, the increase observed in 2015 may have been caused by methodological
changes in how community MRSA environmental pressure is calculated. However, the data indicates that there
has been little change in hospital-onset MRSA bloodstream infection rates between the initial and final
mandatory reporting periods as shown in Fig. 2 and
Table 1, and that as of 2015 the United States did not
achieve the MRSA bloodstream infection reduction goal
of 25% [10].
Another observation is that Table 1 is needed to fully
explain the data acquisition windows’ length and time
periods which are presented in Fig. 2. This adds to the
complexity of data analysis and exemplifies the need for
a more standardized system of reporting.
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Fig. 2 Graph of National (Patient Level) Standardized Infection Ratio (SIR) for MRSA Bloodstream Infections in relationship to MRSA goals and to
the performance of VA hospitals in reducing total non-ICU MRSA infections. Data was used only from hospitals that also had a calculable SIR. The
data acquisition periods for the SIR are shown in Table 1. Only the baseline and final data points for the VA MRSA Infections are shown

U.S. Military and veterans administration (VA) healthcare
systems

U.S. Military facilities and the VA Healthcare Systems
have reported dramatic decreases in MRSA infections.
Landrum, et al. [11] reported a decrease in hospitalonset MRSA bacteremia from 0.7 cases per 100,000
person-years to 0.4 cases per 100,000 person-years from
2005 to 2010. Community-onset MRSA bacteremia decreased from 1.7 to 1.2 cases per 100,000 person-years
during the same time period. However, there was not a
significant decrease in MRSA skin, wound or soft tissue
infections for either hospital-onset or community-onset
MRSA infections. This report analyzed Tricare beneficiaries treated at U.S. Military facilities and was also
based upon laboratory data with hospital-onset
Table 1 Hospital-onset MRSA bloodstream infections – facility
level and national (patient level) performance
Acquisition dates

Average facility
SIR

Average
national SIR

Number
of facilities

1/1/2013 to 9/30/2013

0.95876

0.96766

1666

1/1/2013 to 12/31/2013

0.91540

0.94380

1889

7/1/2013 to 6/30/2014

0.91484

0.91766

1906

10/1/2013 to 9/30/2014

0.89426

0.90195

1904

1/1/2014 to 12/31/2014

0.89134

0.89422

1916

4/1/2014 to 3/31/2015

0.89717

0.90124

1911

7/1/2014 to 6/30/2015

0.92568

0.91835

1899

10/1/2014 to 9/30/2015

0.96378

0.94811

1825

1/1/2015 to 12/31/2015

0.98812

0.98740

1830

Data for National Level Performance was derived from hospitals that also had a
calculable SIR. NHSN data from https://data.medicare.gov/data/hospital-compare
(SIR: Standardized Infection Ratio) (The Facility Level data standard deviation for
acquisition dates 1/1/2014 to 12/31/2014 was 0.7730. The Facility Level data
standard deviation for acquisition dates 1/1/2015 to 12/31/2015 was 0.8753.
Unpaired t-test P < 0.0003)

infections defined as cultures performed greater than
three calendar days after admission.
The VA has also seen a dramatic reduction in MRSA
infections in 127 reporting acute care hospitals. From
October 2007 to October 2015, healthcare-associated
MRSA infection rates dropped 87.0% in ICUs and 80.1%
in non-ICU patient areas, achieving an incidence of
0.147 and 0.090 infections per 1,000 patient days, respectively [12]. In long term care facilities the VA reports MRSA infection reductions of 49.4% from July
2009 to September 2015 [12].
Unlike the private sector, government healthcare delivery systems have a standardized delivery system with
strong national control. Implementation and adherence
to protocols would be expected to be easier. Thus, extrapolating performance data from governmental systems to the private sector should be done with caution.

Discussion
Five reports which had data acquisition periods which
ended on or before 2011 are summarized in Table 2.
These reports measured different types of MRSA infections and measured different patient populations (military facilities, medical centers, general population,
pediatric patients and those who reside in a restricted
geographic area). These variables make comparison of
the various study results difficult. Although, many studies reported data showing a decrease in MRSA infections, increases were found in one study for total MRSA
infections, in another for community-associated infections and another for the assumed MRSA hospitalassociated phenotype. This latter study also observed the
rates for MRSA pneumonia and bloodstream infections
which remained constant In several of the studies the
observed decrease did not reach statistical significance.

2005 to 2010

2005 to 2010

Landrum, et al. [11]

2003 to 2008

Landrum, et al. [11]

2005 to 2010

Iwamoto, et al. [5]

U.S. Military

2005 to 2010

Iwamoto, et al. [5]

David, et al. [7]

2005 to 2010

Iwamoto, et al. [5]

University Healthcare
Consortium Data

2005 to 2010

Iwamoto, et al. [5]

2005 to 2008

2005 to 2011

Dantes, et al. [4]

Klein, et al. [6]

2005 to 2011

Dantes, et al. [4]

Acquisition Dates
2005 to 2011

Dantes, et al. [4]

Surveillance Network
(TSN) Database-USA

Emerging Infection
Program

MRSA Bacteremia

MRSA Bacteremia

MRSA Infections
Coded on Administrative (Billing) Data

MRSA Infections
from Laboratory
isolates combined
with NIS Data

Invasive MRSA

Invasive MRSA

Invasive MRSA

Invasive MRSA

Invasive MRSA

Invasive MRSA

Invasive MRSA

Type of Infection

Geographic Distribution

Tricare Patients Treated at Military
Facilities

Community Onset: Military
Personnel, Retirees, Immediate
Family treated at 266 Military
Facilities

Hospital Onset MRSA: Military
Personnel, Retirees, Immediate
Family treated at 266 Military
Facilities

420 University Hospitals and
Affiliated Hospitals

Patients Discharged From University
Hospitals
Tricare Patients Treated at Military
Facilities

300 Geographic Distributed
Laboratories Across The
United States

Nine Diverse Metropolitan
Areas

Nine Diverse Metropolitan
Areas

Nine Diverse Metropolitan
Areas

Nine Diverse Metropolitan
Areas

Nine Diverse Metropolitan
Areas

Nine Diverse Metropolitan
Areas

Nine Diverse Metropolitan
Areas

MRSA Infections Associated With
Being Hospital-Onset

Pediatric, 3 to 89 days of age:

Pediatric, 90 days and Older:
Community-Associated

Pediatric, 90 days and Older:
Healthcare-Associated
Community-Onset

Pediatric, 90 days and Older:
Hospital-Onset

All Ages: Community- Associated

All Ages: healthcare- Associated
Community-Onset

All Ages: Hospital-Onset

Patient Population

Table 2 Summary of findings of MRSA epidemiology studies with data acquisition periods ending on or before 2011
Results

29% Decrease P < .005

43% Decrease P < .005

100% Increase

MRSA Pneumonia & Blood
Infections Remained Constant,
“assumed” hospital-associated
MRSA phonotype increased.

11.3% per year Decrease

10.2% per year Increase
P = .007

2.6% per year Decrease
P = .60

8.7% per year Decrease
P = .10

5.0% Decrease

27.7% Decrease

54.2% Decrease
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Recent data reported from the VA and NHSN are
more applicable to policy formulation but both data sets
are not comprehensive and are not directly comparable,
since both have different baseline dates and one measures
total MRSA infections and the other MRSA Bloodstream
Infections.
This lack of uniformity of MRSA reporting has hindered the United States’ ability to formulate control
strategies. For example, two different categories of control protocols are starting to emerge. One which is similar to the one used by the VA and is based upon
identification, isolation and/or decolonization. The other
is based on the REDUCE MRSA study [13] and implements a protocol of universal daily bathing with chlorhexidine along with intranasal mupirocin.
As shown in Fig. 2, the VA has reported excellent reductions for MRSA infections compared to little if any reduction that has been observed in recent NHSN data for
MRSA bloodstream infections. But how does one compare the baselines? Maybe the reduction in the NHSN
data had already occurred? This cannot be determined by
the conflicting data in earlier studies (see Table 2). We can
only assume that the 2010–2011 baseline shown in Fig. 2
is at an unacceptable level, since the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services has sent a goal of a 50% reduction by 2020 [14].
This is an important question. The protocol for universal daily chlorhexidine bathing which gained rapid
popularity in the United States was reported in May 2013
and widely disseminated by Agency of Healthcare Research and Quality in September 2013 [15]. Dr. John Jernigan from the CDC in Jan. 2017 stated that “this practice is
now being used routinely in over 60% of hospitals in the
United States” [16]. But using the NHSN data (acquisition
dates from Jan. 1, 2015 to Dec. 31, 2015) the rates of
MRSA bloodstream infections has not appeared to decrease (see Fig. 2) and have now risen almost back to the
baseline (Facility SIR = 0.988; P < 0.0003 compared to
2014 data with acquisition dates from Jan 1, 2014 to Dec.
31, 2014).
However, even this increase can be questioned due to
aberrations in the data caused by compensation for community MRSA environmental pressure on facilities. It
should be noted that these types of adjustments are controversial, since they would also be expected to mitigate
the impact of facilities not doing surveillance in regions
with high environmental MRSA pressure.
Is the United States on the right track and is universal
chlorhexidine bathing a policy which should be implemented on a wide spread basis or should the United
States be expanding the implementation of MRSA
screening and isolation/decolonization protocols? A comprehensive tracking system would be critical in providing
data to answer this question.
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Conclusion
With the various study populations and data gathering
methodologies, comparisons between epidemiological
reports are difficult to make. However, we were not able
to identify firm evidence that there has been a significant
decrease in total or healthcare-associated MRSA Infections in the United States. In addition, the contradictions
between the studies is a testament for the need of a
comprehensive tracking system for MRSA and other
multi-drug resistant organisms. A comprehensive system
should also report infections from all types of healthcare
facilities, not just acute care hospitals. With the advent
of electronic medical records, the reporting of MRSA
cultures and infections along with supplemental information can be automated, making the system less
burdensome.
Policymakers in Washington, DC appears to be focused on major funding of the development of new antibiotics. It is evident that one of the first steps we should
take is the implementation of a comprehensive tracking
system for monitoring resistant organisms, along with
concomitant funding for both the staff and infrastructure. Without this, the difficulty achieving the 2020
MRSA reduction goal of 50% will be hindered [14]. Determining the effectiveness of interventions such as antibiotic stewardship and chlorhexidine bathing will be
impaired. In addition, the United States may not be able
to accurately prioritize antibiotic development, and will
have an encumbered early warning system for the emergence of resistance to newly developed antibiotics.
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